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From an academic standpoint, I see two ways to deal with the current, influent discourse 
of ‘human security’. The first one consists in assessing the internal logic of the 
arguments supporting (or contesting) the new doctrine, and in foreseeing their expected 
political and ethical consequences with the use of logical reasoning. Although valuable, 
such exercises present a risk: as Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 48-51) has put it (following 
Marx), it is a frequent mistake from ‘professional exponents of logos and logic’ to ‘take 
the things of logic for the logic of things’. In reaction, the second, more sociological 
way favours long-term empirical analyses focused on the transforming and unchanged 
practices surrounding the new doctrine and their consequences for the concerned actors, 
in terms of resources, social/political positions and hierarchies, ‘rules of the game’, 
stability and change, etc. 
 
The major interest of David Chandler’s (2008) review is to call for critical distance and 
empirical research as regards human security, in order to understand the growing 
appropriation of this discourse by state officers and bureaucratic decision-makers. This 
is the core of his quite severe criticism on Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. 
Chenoy’s (2007) Human Security: Concepts and Implications. These authors do not 
propose in-depth empirical analyses on that matter, although they do admit the 
possibility of such politically-oriented appropriation when they discuss the relation 
between human security and the ‘responsibility to protect’, as well as the interventionist 
and discretionary content of this doctrine. 
 
The second book discussed by Chandler, A Decade of Human Security: Global 
Governance and New Multilateralisms, edited by Sandra MacLean, David Black and 
Tim Shaw (2006), meets his expectations more accurately. The authors are more 
sceptical of the new ‘paradigm’. And their approach is more empirical. They give more 
importance to the relations between discourse and actual practice, and between both 
discourse and practice and the existing political hierarchies. These authors show 
interestingly the clear absence of any systematic codification regarding collectively 
expected practices in response to well defined ‘threats’. This enables the discretionary 
and interventionist use of the human security discourse by powerful governments or by 
increasingly powerful bureaucratic actors, with the tacit support of its many advocates 
or at least without any open opposition from them. This is the main challenge for the 
doctrine in terms of institutionalisation and global credibility. 
 
In this regard, the three reasons proposed by Chandler (2008) in his conclusion as a 
means to explain the rapid integration of human security approaches into mainstream 
security agendas (they have exaggerated new post-Cold War security threats, have 
located these threats in the developing world, and have facilitated short-term policy-
making in the absence of clear strategic foreign policy visions) deserve to be taken very 
seriously in further empirical research, as they seem the most credible ones. Chandler 
opportunely refers to the tendency to replace political stakes between opposing groups 
with non-political, ‘technical’ considerations about the existing threats and their 
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interconnections. This is one of the vulnerabilities of this discourse, allowing it to be 
shaped ‘conservatively’ by powerful actors in an interest-based (but not necessarily 
state-based) perspective. 
 
Nevertheless, a purely ‘empiricist’ approach would not valid too hastily such a ‘the 
more things change, the more they stay the same’ view without further investigation 
either. To assay the ‘reality’ of the observed changes is a difficult task, a difficulty 
depending on the period and the scope of the observation. Although I sympathize with 
David Chandler’s aim of restoring politics and competition for power to the heart of the 
analysis – an aim that stands opposed to ‘wishful thinking’ assertions on the 
revolutionary nature of human security approaches – there is a risk that theoretical 
possibilities may be dismissed or deprecated too quickly simply on the grounds that 
human security approaches have not yet brought them about. 
 
More particularly, as an important warning for the analysts, the author is keen to point 
out the potential use of this new rhetoric for both reproducing existing decisional 
positions and diluting political responsibilities among diverse national and international 
bureaucratic officers and experts acting on an ad hoc basis (Chandler, 2007). Such 
warning deserves to be largely echoed. But new doctrines may induce changes that do 
not affect, or do not initially affect, the hierarchy of power between existing actors. 
These potential changes may firstly concern the content of the power relationships, the 
type of rule, that is, the rules shared by unchanged dominated and dominating actors 
(Onuf, 1989). Of course this would be a disappointing ‘revolution’, a modest change, 
but this hypothesis deserves in my view to be theoretically envisaged and empirically 
tested as well. Moreover, this would-be change of the ‘rules of the game’ may trigger 
efforts at adjustments that might leave room either for the conquest of influence and 
power by previously dominated actors, or for the reinforcement of already dominant 
actors. Whether this turned out to be the case would require empirical demonstration in 
the long run. 
 
In that regard, I am not completely convinced that Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy make 
logically ‘collapse’ their claim when they assert that ‘human security transforms, rather 
than replaces the national security discourse and is not an alternative to state security’. 
The permanence of the competition for power between organized individuals (within 
states for instance) seems theoretically compatible with a normative shift 
institutionalising individual freedom from physical threats. It seems undeniable that 
security concerns involve ‘political processes of collective decision-making, choices 
and policy trade-offs’. But to assert that ‘the individual qua person becomes the ultimate 
actor taken into account’, ‘the ultimate goal’, does not exactly mean that every single 
individual qua person is able to assure his or her freedom from physical threats by him- 
or herself. What is at stakes underneath is the possible recognition of a new principle 
serving as a new normative boundary in political competitions and processes. Although 
political associations and collective processes around competitive stakes and conflicting 
security concerns seem unavoidable, they might operate through changing ‘rules of the 
games’ where threats on individual physical integrity can be severely and collectively 
regulated or even banned. From a practical point of view, such an outcome seems 
improbable. But from a theoretical point of view, one can admit it may happen, at least 
in a limited social space and during a limited length of time. 
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What are the factors that deserve to be considered in order to assess empirically the 
outcomes of a discourse like human security? A recent trend in IR literature (among 
liberal constructivists essentially) is to focus on explicit arguments and evoked 
principles and norms. Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson, however, convincingly 
stressed the methodological risks in these attempts to demonstrate persuasion in 
political trade-offs and negotiations (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). I drew the same 
conclusion and insisted on the entrenchment of arguments and other political resources 
after assisting and analyzing a specific negotiation within the UNSC (Ambrosetti, 
2004). Let me, then, expose a methodological frame inspired by my own research on the 
humanitarian discourse and the interventionist practices of diplomatic decision-makers 
at the UN Security Council, in a sociological perspective (Ambrosetti 2005a, 2005b, 
2006). It may offer a way to deal with human security discourse as a political resource 
and to assess its possible outcomes empirically. 
 
The individual who hold such a decision-making position needs meet different 
collective expectations from different audiences in order to preserve his/her position. 
These expectations are attached to various other specific positions held in these different 
audiences and groups. Some of these positions are strongly formalised, whereas others 
are more pervasively acknowledged – and more exposed to changes, to risks of 
deprivation. These various specific social positions constitute altogether the political 
resources that enable him/her to hold the studied decision-making position. 
 
The grasp of a new discourse – as human security – by diplomatic decision-makers 
needs be understood in regard to this social environment where expectations and 
resources intermingle. Resources only exist in relation to the particular groups that 
behave as to make these resources exist. And they only exit in relation to the particular 
groups that recognize them as resources. Thus, for an ‘appropriate’ use of their 
resources, decision-makers must abide by the rules whereby these groups keep behaving 
the way they do. And these rules are constructed in the different audiences composing 
the decision-makers’ social environment (Onuf, 1989: 64; March & Olsen, 1998). In 
this environment can be identified regularities and learning processes concerning the 
opportunities and risks attached to these resources. 
 
The human security discourse would not have been accepted and seized by state officers 
if it immediately appeared as an insuperable obstacle that threatened the relative 
positions of these actors in the competitive games between different diplomacies and 
within their own bureaucracies. This means that the human security discourse did not 
seem to represent an unacceptable direction to those who provide state officers with the 
resources that enable the latter to maintain their elevated political positions. 
 
This absence of perceived threats and hostile expectations must be established 
empirically. For instance, the social ‘work’ whereby would-be previously perceived 
threats have been overcome in specific cases must be understood. But the rationale of 
the success of the human security notion may lie in the newness of the term and its lack 
of precision, that is, in the plasticity of the content it would be given. As with every new 
principle, the human security principle authorises different interpretations, urgencies 
and translations in political agendas; it allows progressive moulding in one direction or 
the other, according to processes of public argumentation and private bargaining. In this 
sense, Chandler is right to highlight the possibilities of cooptation inherent in the 
manipulation of this human security principle, as a major reason of its ‘mainstreaming’. 
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However, any political investment in such a new “label” would have been useless, had 
this label not proved its ability to trigger more or less tacit forms of acquiescence in 
diverse large audiences outside the international diplomatic scene, according to the 
legitimacy these audiences accord to it. A genealogy of the term would certainly show 
how it serves to “invite” new audience with individualistic/universalistic preferences to 
enter the field of security debates and to “naturally” support different forms of 
interventionist and intrusive practices against “old-fashioned” state-centred scholars. 
What I intended to prove concerning the humanitarian discourse might well be applied 
to the new rhetoric of human security. 
 
By no means do I state that anything can be done with the human security rhetoric. The 
outcome of this rhetoric depends on the actors (with their unequal resources) and 
audiences who are involved, who feel concerned by this notion and engaged by what is 
done in its name. Will this or that interpretation be considered to be completely normal 
or at least acceptable by a large number of these actors and audiences? If not, the one 
who states such interpretations may expect reactions from others who will not recognise 
the human security agenda and will then empty it of its symbolic and institutional value. 
 
The question is therefore: what remains possible and impossible to do, or collectively 
acceptable and unacceptable, or probable and improbable, within specific audiences 
once this principle is invoked and repeated? What are the precise normative changes 
induced by the repeated use of this principle, even with pure rhetorical intentions? 
Concerning Chandler’s discussion, my argument calls for empirically assessing the 
opportunities but also the risks state decision-makers and international officers are 
exposed to, regarding the different audiences which provide them with their main 
political resources, when they evoke the notion of human security. 
 
A new principle with a largely-acknowledged legitimacy must thus be analysed as a 
new resource for political mobilisation available for the traditional actors, or for newly-
constituted ones. It will merge with other forms of political resources, according to the 
‘rules of use’ of these existing resources and the capacity of innovation of the actors. 
Nothing allows defining in advance the outcome of the new competition that will rise 
around this new principle understood as a new resource, nor the new rules and norms 
that will appear (or not) in the use of this resource and their political consequences. The 
invocation of human security can foster emancipation for some and at the same time 
new submission for others. The outcome of this invocation depends on successful 
linkages between the practices enacted in the name of human security and this very 
principle, that is, on the acceptability of the former in regard of the latter. And this 
outcome must be assessed in accordance with the symbolic and material resources 
mobilised in order to support and secure these linkages. 
 
In this analytical framework, it is useless to oppose power-maximizing practices and 
ethical, valued-centred ‘motivations’, as is often done in both books discussed by David 
Chandler. Against this quite infertile dichotomy, social scientists can only observe 
transforming or unchanging practices surrounding new invoked doctrines such as 
human security, and their political consequences. But they may also understand more 
deeply how actual dominant norms and practices from state officers and decision-
makers can (or cannot) practically integrate concerns stressed by human security 
approaches, and with which potential political consequences. What remains important 
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here is to avoid hasty overall judgments on the human security principle on a binary 
(emancipatory or conservative) basis, and to call again for deep empirical research on 
the practical uses of the human security rhetoric and the shifts they may provoke over 
time in the balance of power and the rules of the political competitions between the 
different actors. 
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